I am argumentative. In the past, arguments would occupy my thoughts for stretches of time. It was inevitable that I generated convincing arguments for what I felt passionate about, even if I was ignorant of the subject at hand. I was recently enlightened to know that, in reading Harry G. Frankfurt’s On Bullshit, this kind of argumentation deemed me, in those moments, a Bullshitter. 

On Bullshit is a philosophical essay that illustrates a general theory surrounding the term bullshit, which is outlined to be a form of speech that is missing a connection to the truth. 

Not Quite Lying

Although Frankfurt does not provide a straight-cut or in-the-box definition for the term bullshit, it is illustrated rather through comparison with the form of speech lying, and by discussion of it’s two key characteristics.

Both bullshitting and lying are misrepresentations. But the key difference between the two is in what the misrepresentation is specifically about. On page 55, Frankfurt writes.

“It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction.”

By this, Frankfurt means that what truly sets the liar apart from the bullshitter is the relationship that each offender shares with the truth. For example, when the liar misrepresents the truth, he must be aware of what the truth actually is, because he is trying to make up an understanding of it that is believable. The bullshitter, on the other hand, is indifferent to truth and falsity, as what he is trying to misrepresent is his apparent relationship to it. This indifference stays consistent to the bullshitter even if what he says does happen to be true. 

Key Characteristics

• The bullshitter remains indifferent to the truth.

• The bullshitter aims to make an impression, not to utilize factual accuracy.

The facts of the matter, whatever they may be, are not relevant, and the bullshitter has no commitment to them. And the misrepresentation of bullshit lies in the ambition of the bullshitter, which allows him to purport himself as knowledgeable, sincere, or invested in the subject matter. As Frankfurt says on page 56.

“He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out or makes them up to suit his purpose.”

I can provide a clean example of bullshit here. Let’s say a group of friends are having a conversation. One boy exclaims, “quantum mechanics explains all the secrets of the universe.”  This is bullshit because the boy does not know what the theories of quantum mechanics say about the universe. But moreover it is bullshit because the boy doesn’t even care what the theories of quantum mechanics say. Maybe they do reveal the secrets of the universe and maybe they don’t. That is besides the boy’s interest because he just wants to appear a certain way when he makes statements like that. What is being misrepresented is not reality itself, but the boy’s relationship to it. 

So Much Bullshit

In the closing pages of the essay, Frankfurt speculates as to why bullshit appears so much in conversation. The first being that it is inevitable when somebody is obligated to speak about something that they do not know much about. The second is the widely held notion that everyone must have an opinion about everything. This may be fueled subconsciously by a desire to be an active and conscientious member of society.

The Damage

Because Frankfurt doesn’t provide much more to why the declaration of bullshit is so dangerous I did some brainstorming on my end to figure it out. When bullshit is utilized and accepted in a conversation it is harmful for reasons that connect to one large one.

That main reason being that the factual basis for contributing a comment of substance to a discussion is eradicated. This isn’t to say that discussions are only valuable when facts are being recounted, but its important especially when speaking about topics that concern the lives of others to be well informed and to have done the due diligence. The smaller sub-reasons include the fact that people can be enabled to say anything so long as its convincing, a new level of pessimism must be adopted to be sure that nobody speaking is bullshitting, and that discourse loses substance at almost every level.